












Abstract. From the point of view of Husserl’s critique of empiricist theories of ab-
straction in the Logical Investigations, it seems that Brentano and most of his students 
would have endorsed the presupposition of Locke’s theory of abstraction, which 
Husserl labels as the ‘psychological hypostatization of the general’. For Husserl him-
self, but also for most of his followers, the motivation behind this critique is that the 
descriptive psychology of the School of Brentano leads to psychologism if one 
doesn’t accept Platonic ideal objects. 
In the following article, I argue that Husserl’s critique doesn’t do justice to the ac-
counts of abstraction developed in the school of Brentano. I take here the particular 
case of Carl Stumpf, showing that not only does Husserl’s accusation miss its target, 
but also that it attribute indirectly to Stumpf a position that he didn’t defend. I suggest 
that even before the Logical Investigations, Stumpf formulated the basis of an account 
of abstraction in terms of generalization, an account which will later turn out to be in 
many ways compatible with Husserl’s theory of Spezies in the Logical Investigations, 
and which provide a viable alternative both to Platonism and to Empiricism, thereby 




0 Abstraction in the School of Brentano 
It has often been stated that the account of perception developed in the 
school of Brentano owes much to the British Empiricist tradition, and 
in particular to Locke. According to Brentano’s account (and to the 
accounts of many of his students), what the mind perceives are not ex-
ternal objects but so-called contents, which are caused by external ob-
jects. With the exception of the term ‘content’, to which he prefers 
‘idea’, Locke would agree with this description. In addition, from very 
early on Brentano agreed with Hume to the effect that inseparable 
parts of a visual perception, like the form and the colour of a per-
ceived object, may be distinguishable through exercise and practice, 
but that these parts are inseparable in the real act of perception. Dis-




tionis – which is the work of abstraction understood as a psychologi-
cal function. 
In this context, it is not surprising to see that Brentano and his 
school tackled the problem of abstraction along similar lines to the 
British Empiricists. Like the British Empiricists, Brentano and his 
school were concerned with the possibility of abstraction as a mental 
faculty, and correlatively, with the possibility of the existence of such 
abstract entities. In his published writings at least, Brentano himself 
didn’t take great pains to debate the metaphysical aspect of the prob-
lem of abstraction – namely the question of whether there are abstract 
objects, or universals. Throughout his career, he regarded Platonic re-
alism as a mistake in which being is attributed to universals, and thus 
he considered the position indefensible: universals in the Platonic 
sense never were part of his ontology.
1
 In his view, the problem of ab-
straction is primarily of an epistemological or psychological nature: 
do abstract presentations constitute a specific category of mental ac-
tivities, distinct from concrete presentations, or do they belong to the 
same category? In the latter case, how are they to be distinguished 
from concrete presentations? Is abstraction a well-defined mental op-
eration distinct from the mere perception of intuitive presentations and 
their contents? 
Considering only his published works, it might seem that Brentano 
never really settled these questions. Over the course of his career, he 
and his students developed different accounts of abstraction. Without 
clearly arguing for a core position, Brentano was originally inclined to 
favour the view that abstract and intuitive presentations are simply 
two varieties of one single intentional mode – namely, presenting. As 
two varieties of presenting, distinct in virtue of, among other things, 
their respective degrees of intensity, abstract and intuitive presenta-
tions basically belong to the same class of mental acts on this view. 
This position has been widely discussed among Brentano’s students, 
                                                 
1
 It is therefore surprising to read in Rosen (2012), that ‘the common theme [between 
Frege, Bolzano, and Brentano and his pupils] is the felt need in semantics and psy-
chology as well as in mathematics for a class of objective (i.e., non-mental) supersen-
sible entities’. Although this may apply to the first two philosophers mentioned, it is 
definitely not the case for Brentano. See, for example, the early Brentano in his 1867 
lectures on metaphysics: ‘all arguments, on which is based the supposition of ideas 
outside the individual, are void’ (‘Alle Argumente, worauf die Annahme der Ideen 
ausser den Einzeldingen ruht, sind nichtig’) (M96, B 17311). On the mistake of Pla-
to’s realism, see also Brentano (1925, 276); (1925a, 136); (1976, 200); (1986, 76). 
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and he himself called it, in his Vienna lectures on logic, a ‘monistic’ 
or ‘noetic-monistic’ position. This was generally opposed to the so-
called ‘dualistic’ or ‘noetic-dualistic’ view, according to which intui-




In discussion and correspondence with Marty and Stumpf between 
the 1870s and the end of the 1890s, Brentano later came to refine his 
views on the relation between intuition and abstraction, moving from 
a ‘monistic’ account to a weak ‘noetic-dualistic’ view. Since they ex-
changed extensively on these issues, since Brentano considered 
Stumpf his most promising student,
3
 and since the views developed by 
the master evolved constantly, a closer look at the conceptions devel-
oped mutually by Stumpf and Brentano might give us a privileged 
view on the debates surrounding the problem of abstraction in the 
school of Brentano. As a matter of fact, the evolution of their respec-
tive views on abstraction is rather peculiar: they both first advocated 
for a ‘monistic’ account in the early 1870s, then developed, between 
the mid-1880s and the mid-1890s, using different resources, a so-
called ‘ennoetist’ account along the lines of the first account, accord-
ing to which abstraction works in conjunction with attention, which is 
an act of interest. Finally, at the end of the 1890s, they both rejected 
the ennoetist-monistic view of abstraction for very different reasons: 
even if it makes sense to say that both Stumpf and Brentano came to 
endorse a weak version of dualism, this doesn’t do justice to the di-
vergence in their respective positions. Where Stumpf started to argue 
for the necessity of a specific abstractive function called generaliza-
tion, Brentano argued for a conception of abstraction as a higher-order 
presentation. 
At first glance, getting a better look at the development of abstrac-
tion in the early school of Brentano might seem to be a mere philolog-
ical exercise, in particular from the perspective of Husserl’s critique of 
empiricist theories of abstraction in the Logical Investigations:
4
 with-
out mentioning Brentano as an advocate of such theories, Husserl 
thought that Twardowski’s largely Brentanian account of general 
                                                 
2
 See Brentano, EL72, 12333. Marty borrows this distinction from Brentano in his 
lectures on descriptive psychology from 1894/95. See Marty (2010, 115). 
3
 See Brentano’s letter to Stumpf of 1903, in this volume. 
4





presentations suffered from the mistakes of Locke’s theory of abstrac-
tion, which he called the ‘psychological hypostatization of the gen-
eral’ – a form of psychologism.
5
 Stumpf’s theory of abstraction in 
terms of selective attention to partial contents (Stumpf 1890) is also 
subject to Husserl’s criticisms given in different places of the second 
Logical Investigation.
6
 Finally, since Marty, in correspondence with 
Husserl about the second Logical Investigation, objected to Husserl’s 
criticisms and explicitly advocated for a ‘psychological hypostatiza-
tion of the general’,
7
 it makes good sense, at least from Husserl’s per-
spective, to see the abstraction theories of Stumpf and Brentano and 




Still today, this narrative seems to be dominant when it comes to 
characterizing Husserl’s position in the Logical Investigations and his 
criticism of psychologism, which are seen against the background of 
his philosophical upbringing as a member of the School of Brentano.
9
 
The idea behind this narrative, to put it crudely, is that the descriptive 
psychology of the School of Brentano leads to psychologism if one 
doesn’t accept Platonic ideal objects.
10
 However, there are good rea-
sons to question this narrative, precisely when one considers the evo-
lution of the accounts sketched above. If Husserl’s accusation that a 
‘psychological hypostatization of the general’ might apply to some of 
Brentano and Stumpf’s early accounts of abstraction, this clearly 
doesn’t do justice to the accounts developed in the late 1890s, as I 
                                                 
5
 Husserl 1901, 121ff. 
6
 See especially Husserl (1901, §§19 and 40). 
7
 See HUABW01, 75ff. 
8
 It seems that Husserl already held this view in 1897, when he writes to Natorp that 
his Logical Investigations, on which he was still working, were ‘directed against the 
subjectivist-psychologizing logic of our time (thus against the standpoint which I ad-
vocated earlier as a pupil of Brentano)’ (HUABW05, 43). 
9
 Husserl himself contributed decisively to the understanding of his phenomenology 
as fundamentally distinct from Brentano’s philosophy. See, for instance, the preface 
of the second edition of the Logical Investigations (Hua XVIII, 7), or his ‘Reminis-
cences of Brentano’: ‘I was an enthusiastic pupil […] still, it was not to be that I 
should remain a member of his school’ (Husserl 1976, 53). 
10
 Huemer (2004, 203) formulates the idea very clearly: ‘Only after having accepted 
the realm of ideal objects, could Husserl give up Brentano’s empirical standpoint’. 
Others, like Willard (2002, 80), see the critique of psychologism as incompatible with 
the School of Brentano: ‘Husserl ceased to be in the School of Brentano at some point 
in the 1890s’. 
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want to show. In Stumpf’s case in particular, not only does the accusa-
tion miss its target, but it also attributes to Stumpf a position that he 
didn’t defend. In fact, as I will suggest, as early as 1896 – 5 years be-
fore the publication of the Logical Investigations – Stumpf formulated 
the basis of an account of abstraction in terms of generalization, an ac-
count which will later turn out, with some exception, to be in many 
ways compatible with Husserl’s theory of Spezies in the Logical In-
vestigations. 
In what follows, I start with a reconstruction of the different ac-
counts of abstraction in the school of Brentano, including Stumpf’s, 
which led to the so-called weak dualist view defended by the school 
between 1891 and 1902 (sections 1 to 3). In the second part of the pa-
per (sections 4 and 5), I show how Stumpf’s later account of abstrac-
tion remained true to Brentano’s rejection of Platonic ideal objects, 
while also offering an account of the ‘products’ or Gebilde of abstrac-
tion compatible with the objectivity of concepts and propositions – a 
demand which Brentanian descriptive psychology wouldn’t be able to 
meet, at least according to Husserl and the narrative surrounding the 
development of his phenomenology. More generally, the reconstruc-
tion provided here aims to show that, contrary to what is supposed by 
the received view based on Husserl’s critique of psychologism in the 
Logical Investigations, there is no ‘standard psychologistic account’ 
of abstraction defended by the School of Brentano, neither by Brenta-
no himself, nor by Stumpf or Marty – who usually are considered to 
be the most representative members of the school. 
 
1 The starting point: the ‘monistic’ account of abstraction 
As is commonly known, Brentano held the view that judicative and 
emotional mental acts are based on more primitive ones, namely pres-
entations. These in turn are also based on a variety of primitive pres-
entations called sensations. When I judge that the Eiffel Tower exists, 
my judgment is an acceptance of the presented object: the Eiffel 
Tower. Now the Eiffel Tower is not an object of sensation: sensations 
have as objects sensory qualities like colours and tones and their prop-
erties, like intensity, constancy, luminosity, etc. This is the reason why 
Brentano suggests that the presentation of an object such as the Eiffel 
Tower is an ‘abstract presentation’ based on single simple presenta-
tions: sensations of colour, of different shapes in spatial organization, 




presentation in intuition when I present it. Rather, I am presented in-
tuitively with single colours and shapes, which build the content of my 
sensation and which Brentano calls ‘physical phenomena’. For an or-
dinary object such as the Eiffel Tower to become the content of a 
presentation, multiple acts of sensation are necessary, as well as the 
functions of analysis and abstraction. This is why Brentano calls pres-
entations of ordinary objects and of properties abstract presentations: 
they involve an operation (of abstraction) on single acts of sensation. 
Such an operation may or may not be involved in a mental act: for ex-
ample, seeing a red patch doesn’t involve this operation, while seeing 
different patches of red organized in space in the shape of a ball, i.e., 
seeing a red ball, involves such a operation of abstraction. 
In his published works, Brentano rarely discusses the nature and 
the role of abstraction – neither the psychological process nor the re-
sult of this process, namely abstract entities. However, his lectures and 
correspondence contain some useful precisions that make a recon-
struction of his account of abstraction possible, and with it a recon-
struction of some of the core issues regarding abstraction and abstract 
objects in his school. Taking these lectures as a starting point, we can 
roughly distinguish between four accounts of abstraction in Brenta-
no’s works. The first account is developed as part of his theory of 
parts and wholes in the Würzburger metaphysics lectures of 1867, 
where, influenced by Aristotle (Met. 1034 b32), he proposes a distinc-
tion between three kinds of parts – thus formulating the problem of 
abstraction for the first time. Brentano distinguishes there between 1) 
physical parts, like single corns (parts) in a pile of corn (whole); 2) 
logical parts of an object, which are parts of the definition of its con-
cept. For example, the property of being coloured is a logical part of 
the property of being red; and virtue is a logical part of courageous-
ness. In his 1867 lectures, before turning to a non-propositional theory 
of judgment, Brentano used the locution ‘[…] is a logical part of’ in-
terchangeably with ‘[…] can be predicated of _’. And 3) metaphysical 
parts, which are non-physical parts, and are the determinations of an 
object, or its categories: substance, location, space, time, thinking, ac-
cidents, etc. In contrast with physical parts, which are themselves 
physical, metaphysical parts are called abstract parts or abstracta:
11
 
an abstractum in this sense would be, for instance, the substance of 
                                                 
11
 See Brentano, (M96, B17193). 
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the telephone on my desk, taken in isolation from the other parts of the 
metaphysical whole in which the telephone inheres. Considered with-
out its location, its spatial extension, its colour, etc., the telephone is 
nothing but an abstract object. The same holds for any other meta-
physical part isolated from the whole.
12
 
Following this account, taken from the Metaphysics lectures, Bren-
tano goes on to say that an abstract presentation is obtained by taking 
in isolation a metaphysical part from the metaphysical whole, like the 
abstraction of [the substance of] Socrates without his accidents, or one 
of the accidents of ‘the great Socrates’ taken in abstraction from the 
metaphysical whole. Nothing is said here on the psychological opera-
tion of abstraction; Brentano is simply saying that abstract objects, 
like virtue, courageousness, or Socrate’s courageousness, are abstract 
in virtue of being isolated and non-autonomous parts of metaphysical 
wholes. However, these abstract objects are pure fictions. They are al-
so called Essenzen, Spezies, Praedicamente, or Divisiva. In his view, 
these are simply fictio cum fundamento in re. Abstracta, or metaphysi-
cal parts, ‘are only determined as different things through a fiction of 
our understanding’.
13
 Abstracta are therefore divisiva: they are created 




Stumpf endorsed this initial account in his book on spatial percep-
tion (Stumpf 1873). There, he argues that contents are generally pre-
sented ‘together’ (zusammenvorgestellt), but that this togetherness 
comes in two categories: autonomous contents (selbständige Inhalte) 
can be presented both together and separately, while partial contents 
(Teilinhalte) can’t be presented separately. Colour and extension, for 
instance, are Teilinhalte in this sense. This is where abstraction comes 
into play: in order to present extension separately from colour, I must 
make abstraction of it. Stumpf suggests an analogy between predica-
tion and the abstraction operated on partial contents, such that I can’t 
have a presentation of a property of an object without having a presen-
tation of the object of which it is predicated. So in ‘copper is heavy’, 
heaviness is an abstractum, or a partial content, of the presentation of 
copper, since there is no heaviness without a body that has this quali-
                                                 
12
 See M 96, MS 31985 and 31535; see also Baumgartner (2013, 23). 
13
 German original: ‘sind nur durch Fiktion des Verstandes wie verschiedene Dinge 
gesetzt’ (B17359). 
14






 Along the same lines as Brentano’s conception of metaphysical 
parts, Stumpf suggests that we see predicative relations as metaphysi-
cal wholes in which the single parts (here copper, and heaviness) are 
thought as a unity (i.e. as a metaphysical whole). The point about the 
inseparability of space and quality, and the analogous case of insepa-
rability concerning presented predicates and their subjects, supports 
Stumpf’s view that space is a primitive element in presentations. To 
him space is as primitive as sensed qualities, e.g. colours, telling us 
that ‘there is a visual space, i.e. a particular sensory content which is 
sensed directly, in the same way as colour qualities and as a conse-
quence of optical nervous processing, and which possesses all the 
characteristics we attribute to space’ (Stumpf 1873, 272). 
In his discussion of differentiation and perception (Stumpf 1873, 
130ff), Stumpf develops a psychological application of Brentano’s 
theory of metaphysical (abstract) parts. When hearing a chord, both 
the inexperienced and the trained music listener perceive a unitary 
sensation, or a whole constituted by parts; while the trained music lis-
tener is able to distinguish the parts of the whole, the inexperienced 
music listener only has access to the unitary sensation. The differen-
tiation of parts is conditioned by experience, training, and memory. It 
is indeed on this basis that a trained music listener will be able to dis-
tinguish between single tones in the hearing of a chord. 
While it is true to say that, strictly speaking, when listening to a C 
chord, both listeners hear the same chord and have the same presenta-
tion content, this shouldn’t be taken to mean that the single parts of 
the heard chord are equally perceived by both the inexperienced and 
the trained music listener. Presentation contents are by definition uni-
tary contents, which may or may not be perceived distinctly.
16
 How-
ever, the distinctness of the perception doesn’t change anything with 
regard to the unitary nature of the content. Even if the single tones C, 
E, and G are not perceived by the untrained music listener when she 
hears a C chord, she still is presented with the same content as the 
trained music listener hearing a C chord. As Stumpf puts it, 
 
the […] plurality in unity rests on an operative thinking 
(hineindenken). Every content […] is in itself fully unitary, although a 
                                                 
15
 Stumpf (1873, 113–114). 
16
 Compare Stumpf 1873, 133: ‘we only distinguish what has been perceived sepa-
rately’. 
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plurality of relations attaches immediately to it for us, in the way these 
are fixed by linguistic expressions. The decomposition of the content 
itself is therefore only virtual, although it is not arbitrary, but neces-
sary, since every similarity and every distinction is imposed upon us 
by the content itself. We operate – to quote an expression of the Scho-
lastics – a distinctio cum fundamento in re’. (Stumpf 1873, p. 139) 
 
The same kind of operative thinking is at play when it comes to gen-
eral concepts: ‘we use to […] to treat [general concepts] as qualities or 
entities, or generally as something which would inhere the things or at 
least the individual presentations. General concepts only designate 
something which understanding makes with the individual presenta-
tions, or more precisely, the possibility, from the side of the latter, to 
sustain this operation’ (137). This position is in line with Brentano’s 
in the metaphysics lectures, and shares its conceptualist orientation. 
Abstract concepts, and abstracta in general, are therefore seen as 
the result of an operation realized on unitary contents. Since this oper-
ation is only virtual, the abstracta are merely conceptual. They are not 
‘in’ things, yet they are nevertheless not purely linguistic entities, 
since they are grounded in things. 
To which extent should this account be labelled a ‘monistic’ ac-
count? The basic reason for calling Stumpf’s account monistic is that 
it characterizes abstraction as belonging to the category of mental op-
erations (operating here on the class of presentations as a whole), and 
not to the category of mental acts or phenomena. As a consequence, 
primitive sensations, but also imaginative presentations, memory 
presentations, and even symbolic presentations all belong to one sin-
gle class of mental phenomena. This makes it a ‘monistic’ account of 
abstraction since presentations involving abstraction (like the presen-
tation of a single tone in a chord) are not categorically distinct from 
presentations that don’t involve abstraction (like the indistinct presen-
tation of the chord). In both cases, we face one and the same content, 
with its ‘necessary’ or intrinsic decomposition structure. Since the op-
eration realized on the contents by abstraction is merely ‘virtual’, so-
called ‘abstract presentations’ are not structurally different from intui-
tive presentations. This is the gist of the monistic account. 
 
2 The Ennoetist Account 
The second account of abstraction is first discussed in 1875 and seems 




ent periods and until around 1900 by Brentano, Stumpf, and Marty. 
By 1875, Brentano had developed the view according to which ab-
stracta, considered as collectives, are so-called intentional entities or 
immanent objects.
17
 In correspondence with Stumpf in 1876, Brentano 
recalls a discussion they had in 1875 in Vienna, in which he exposed a 
‘new hypothesis’ to Stumpf concerning abstraction.
18
 Following this 
new hypothesis, abstracta can only be represented distinctly as parts 
in concreta, but not as such outside of them. Brentano also refers to 
Berkeley for support for this view.
19
 More generally, he underlines 
that there is no authentic (or autonomous, ‘im eigentlichen Sinn’) ab-
stract presenting.
20
 Along these lines, he began to leave the conceptu-
alist account given in his metaphysics lectures aside, instead adapting 
his theory of abstraction as a part of his descriptive psychology. It is 
precisely in this context that he developed his theory of ennoetism. 
Brentano says of ennoetism that it shares with nominalism the idea 
that there is only one kind of presenting activity for both concrete and 
abstract presentations – in this sense, ennoetism is a form of monistic 
position – but that this one activity is guided by a more or less impor-
tant degree of interest, which can allow the subject to focus on parts of 
the presentation.
21
 Such an account shares aspects of Mill’s concep-
tion of abstraction, according to which: 
 
we have, properly speaking [no general concepts]; we have only com-
plex ideas of objects in the concrete: but we are able to attend exclu-
sively to certain parts of the concrete idea; and by that exclusive atten-
tion, we enable those parts to determine exclusively the course of our 
thoughts. (Mill, 1979, 309) 
 
Following Mills’ theory, but also Brentano’s in this respect, I can form 
the general concept of the colour red by focusing my attention on parts 
of a concrete presentation of a red object; but this doesn’t mean that I 
                                                 
17
 See also EL72, 12342f. ‘[O]ur act of presentation, our whole self, as inner percep-
tion shows us, is a unity. The immanent object of the unitary complete presentation is 
a collective’. 
18
 See Baumgartner (ed.) (1992, 37). 
19
 See Berkeley (1734, §10): ‘[…] Extension, Figure, and Motion, abstracted from all 
other Qualities, are inconceivable’. The same passage was also discussed favorably 
against Kant’s understanding of space in Stumpf (1873, 24). 
20
 See Baumgartner (ed.) (1992, 42). 
21
 See for instance Brentano (EL72, 12340). 
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have a general or abstract presentation of red (or that I am presenting 
red under a different mode) when I think about what is shared in gen-
eral by red things.
22
 In his Vienna lectures on logic (EL 72), Brentano 
explains his theory in the following way: 
 
[I]n relation with the question of universals, it appears that when I also 
have no other presentations than individual presentations, in a certain 
way, I do have them [i.e. universals] – namely as partial presentations 
circumscribed through a particular interest – and this way is sufficient 
to give to the general name not simply a plurality of equivocal indi-
vidual meanings, as the nominalists wanted, but rather a unitary, truly 
general sense. (Brentano EL 72, 12349) 
 
As such, there is a sense in which we can say that Fred and his friend 
both form the same general concept of red, provided that they focus 
their attention on the same features of the presented object. In this 
way, the abstract name ‘colour’ is not a simple fiction, as it was in 
Brentano’s first account of abstraction in the Metaphysics lectures, in-
stead it has a ‘truly general sense’, without requiring the acceptance of 
abstract entities in one’s ontology. 
This account introduces general presentations as having abstracta 
as intentional entities, isolated on the basis of an act of interest. These 
acts of interest are directed towards parts of presentation contents that 
are not intuitive as such. In other words, redness as an object of 
presentation is constituted by intuitive and non-intuitive parts: the in-
tuitive parts are the visual content or individual presentations and its 
properties (hue, brightness, constancy, etc.), while the non-intuitive 
parts (the property of being a colour) are co-present in the presentation 
content, but are not accessible in presentations as such. Thanks to an 
act of interest in the relevant part of the presentational content, we can 
isolate the abstract presentation, which otherwise would simply be an 
indistinct part of the intuitive presentation of the red colour. 
But how does this work? According to ennoetism, the partial 
presentations that are focused upon are the object of a particular inter-
est. These partial presentations are concepts – and thereby act as me-
diator for further psychical activities – on the sole basis of the act of 
                                                 
22
 Compare Brentano (EL72, 12005): ‘Ennoetism is satisfactory. Without assuming a 
multiple mode of presenting, ennoetism gives an account of the difference between 




interest directed towards them. Therefore, no parts of presentations are 
intrinsically conceptual; they are made conceptual by an act of inter-
est: 
 
[T]here is only one mode of presenting activity, […] [but] through the 
detaching and unifying force of a particular interest, directed exclu-
sively upon one or certain parts of the complete presentation, these 
parts of presentation can become mediator of nomination and presen-




Following this account, when I see a red table, the presentation of the 
table is a partial presentation, which in itself is not intuitive: I see only 
patches of colour. But this partial presentation contributes to the indi-
viduation of the object of my presentation. This contribution is not ef-
fected on the basis of a new mental activity – it’s just that this ‘partial 
presenting’ becomes the object of an act of attention. This attention is 
judgmental: I see the red table and I judge that ‘this presenting shows 
a red table’ or that ‘this presenting of a red table exists’. The focus 
thus bestowed upon the partial presentation of the table ‘elevates’, so 
to speak, the partial presentation to the level of a mediator (Vermittler) 
or a sign. According to ennoetism, concepts are to be considered as 
modified intuitions: they are modified thanks to the focus bestowed 
upon them by specific judgments or acts of interest or attention. 
As suggested en passant in the last quote, Brentano thinks that this 
interest, as the key element for abstractive thinking, also works with 
multiple partial presentations. Such an interest ‘can be directed uni-
tarily toward multiple particular parts of a presentation’ (EL72, 
12350). So, for example, I can hear and enjoy or take interest in a se-
ries of tones unitarily (einheitlich), and this enjoyment or interest is 
distinct from the enjoyment or interest taken in the tones individually, 
although at no point does it involve something like ‘fusion’ 
(Verschmelzung) of presentations: ‘that which “fuses” is the particular 
unitary interest’ (see EL72, 12350). I can also have a unitary interest 
in the multiple tones of a chord, which would make the presentation of 
the chord (or the melody) an abstract presentation. Finally, and more 
generally, the ennoetist theory can also account for compound con-
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 See Brentano (EL72, 12340). Interestingly, we find in Marty (1894/2010, 125) the 
exact same sentence. 
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cepts, like disjunctive, reflexive, or contradictory concepts.
24
 In this 
way, the unitary interest directed toward multiple parts of presenta-
tions serves as an explanans for the fact that abstract presentations are 
not obtained through the mere sum of single intuitive presentations, 
without introducing a second mode of presenting, and correlatively, 
without having to accept abstract objects – which would be the objects 
of such a mode of presenting. 
In Halle, Stumpf partly integrated Brentano’s ennoetism into his 
account of abstraction, which was being developed at around the same 
time. The account developed in his psychology lectures, but also in his 
Tonpsychologie, can be summarized in the following way: an abstract 
feature gets isolated from the whole, although it is not, as such, 
thought of more precisely (vervollständigt). In some sense, one could 
say that the abstracted feature is an incomplete partial presentation. 
However, this isolating of the abstract feature doesn’t involve any 
change in the presenting activity as such: abstracting the feature 
doesn’t give me another presentation. Rather, it has what Stumpf calls 
a judicative difference: it is a noticing (Bemerken), a mode of perceiv-
ing belonging to the class of judgments (affirmations). 
Stumpf’s view of abstraction in the second volume of his 
Tonpsychologie (1890) bears many similarities to Brentano’s ennoetist 
account, but there are two important differences. First, Stumpf consid-
ers abstraction to be a function of judicative (bemerken) acts. Isolating 
a part from the whole of my presentation is for Stumpf a noticing of 
this part; it is not as such an act of interest. Noticing involves analysis, 
which means a noticing of a plurality, and relations (vergleichen). It is 
the noticing itself (and not the ‘noticed partial presentations’) that is 
subject to the interest (Stumpf speaks here of pleasure, (Lust)) in-
volved in an abstractive process. In Stumpf’s view, while abstract 
parts of a presentation content are noticed thanks to the judicative act 
of noticing, this noticing can itself be conditioned by attention 
(Aufmerksamkeit), which Stumpf calls a ‘pleasure in noticing’ (Lust 
am Bemerken).
25
 Stumpf’s example is the hearing of the strokes of the 
clock: when suddenly the clock starts striking, I cannot but notice the 
strokes. The individual strokes are parts of my individual intuitive au-
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 Stumpf doesn’t affirm that every noticing is conditioned by attention. Extreme pain, 





ditory presentation, which are noticed as individual strokes. What 
makes me perceive them as a series of strokes – what makes me notice 
the strokes – and eventually allows me to reproduce in auditory imag-
ination the series of strokes (and eventually allows me to count them 
as a series of seven strokes in this reproduction), is the pleasure I take 
in noticing them. This pleasure in noticing is also characterized by 
Stumpf as a ‘will to notice a content (as part of a whole) or the will to 
notice something in a content (parts or relations thereof)’ (Stumpf 
1890, 284). In other words, what ones notices in perception are parts 
of a whole or the relations between the parts of a whole. Noticing iso-
lates the parts or the relations between them, and the pleasure taken in 
noticing allows one to identify parts or relations between parts that are 
not only extended in space, but also extended in time. In this way, 
Stumpf’s account paves the way for the perception of temporally ex-
tended abstracta, like melodies. 
The second difference between Stumpf’s account of abstraction in 
Tonpsychologie and the Brentanian ennoetist account is correlated 
with the first. While in the Brentanian ennoetist framework it is the 
unitary act of interest that warrants the perception of complex wholes 
(like melodies or chords) as unitary objects of the same mode of pre-
senting, rather than intuitive presentations – I hear melodies and 
chords in the exact same way as I hear single tones, according to the 
ennoetist view – the view advocated by Stumpf is based on fusion: it 
is an intrinsic property of some of the partial contents of a presentation 
that they have a more or less important degree of fusion (Stumpf 
1890, 65f.). Eights, for instance, will have the highest degree of fusion 
in auditory perception, followed by fifths, fourths, etc.
26
 I can single 
out some of the partial presentations of a general presentation by no-
ticing them, but this singling out doesn’t necessarily depend on inter-
est, and there is no unitary interest that binds the parts together.
27
 Ra-
ther, according to Stumpf in the Tonpsychologie, at least for some 
sensory cases like hearing tones, a multiplicity can be perceived di-
rectly without the help of a unitary act of interest. On this basis, 
Stumpf rejects the thesis that interest is an essential part of the abstrac-
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tive process, although it is obviously involved in cases of attention. By 
introducing the idea of fusion, Stumpf allows for cases where multi-
plicities are perceived as such, and not as a single intuitive content. In 
short, although interest plays a role in abstraction, it doesn’t play the 
central role attributed to it by the Brentanian ennoetist account of ab-
straction. 
It should be noted in passing that Stumpf’s model of attention as 
pleasure taken in noticing the parts of a whole was also adopted by the 
early Husserl. In an early paper of 1893, Husserl clearly uses Stumpf’s 
distinction between the pleasure taken in noticing parts of the whole 
and the whole itself.
28
 Through distinguishing between the intuitive 
presence of an object in front of us – the intuition proper, e.g. the sin-
gle tones heard – and the mere consideration of it in its absence – e.g. 
representing the tones (Repräsentation) as a melody – , Husserl sug-
gests a similar account of the ‘intending something absent’ involved in 
the representation as that suggested by Stumpf in the case of noticing. 
Similarly to the act of noticing, in Husserl’s account the representation 
is moved by a feeling of pleasure taken in noticing, a ‘rein im 
Gegenstand aufgehende Lust am Bemerken’.
29
 The fulfilling of the 
representation is characterized as a ‘liberation of tension’, ‘release of 
inhibition’, or a ‘discharge’.
30
 In other words, the pleasure taken in no-
ticing is realized thanks to the fulfilled intuition, in which the noticed 
parts are given. 
While relying on Stumpf’s view of attention as Lust am Bemerken, 
Husserl however rejected in his 1893 paper the view that noticing is a 
kind of judgment; although he interprets this noticing as being moved 
by the pleasure taken in it. If ennoetism is a monistic view, as Marty 
and Brentano contend – i.e., a view in which the intuitive and abstract 
presentations are only gradually, and not categorically distinguished – 
it seems that Husserl had already rejected ennoetism by 1893. Since 
the representation (or noticing) constitutes for Husserl a different 
mode of consciousness than the intuition (Hua XXII, 115–116), the 
isolating role of abstraction is not performed by a judicative form of 
noticing; rather, abstraction is a representative function. 
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3 Abandonment of Ennoetism and Weak Dualism 
Although Stumpf’s account of attention as Lust am Bemerken bears 
important similarities to Brentano’s ennoetist conception of abstrac-
tion, the account developed in the Tonpsychologie departs signifi-
cantly from the ennoetist account championed by Brentano between 
the 1880s and the 1890s. 
Brentano’s abandonment of ennoetism is clearly exposed in ‘Ab-
straction and Relation’, written in 1899, where he rejects the ennoetist 
account of abstraction for a different reason: before even being the fo-
cus of attention, the partial presentations must somehow be structured 
in a way that allows attention to isolate the relevant parts.
31
 This struc-
ture is what Brentano calls a thought (Gedanke), which involves both 
intuitive and predicative elements: 
 
If a being is presented, such that an object in the external world ob-
tains, this external object is never presented exhaustively, but rather, 
as one says, in terms of certain features, but not in others. 
As a consequence, every object in the external world can be an object 
of different presentations. One grasps it in terms of these features, 
[while] another [grasps it] in terms of other features, others either 
completely or partially. Or, what means the same, there are different 
presentations, the objects of which are identical with each other. 
Something white, for instance, can be something sweet. Presentations 
that differ in content have the same object. (The features that are taken 
up in the presentation are its content.) […]. Then again, it can happen 
that a presentation becomes indeterminate by not taking up the object 
in all of its features. Such presentations are called general presenta-
tions, general concepts […]. Such general presentations are not found 
among our intuitions, but rather only among our thoughts which are 
formed from intuitions by means of abstraction. (Here the expression 
“thought” is restricted to a class of presentations. Very often judg-
ments are also included under this term.) […] Thoughts are partly of 
intuitive, partly of predicative unity. The latter is given when the ob-
jects for presentations that differ in content are identified, and hereby 
a presentation of this identical [object] is formed. (Brentano 2013, 
434) 
 
It is likely that Stumpf also endorsed Brentano’s motives for rejecting 
ennoetism. A few years after the publication of the Tonpsychologie, 
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Stumpf makes an interesting remark in a letter to Brentano of the 17
th
 
March, 1896 – a few months before the Munich congress of psychol-
ogy of 1896 – which indicates that he complemented his earlier view 
of attention as Lust am Bemerken with a view of abstraction or synthe-
sis (Zusammenfassen) as a distinct kind of presenting: 
 
Concerning the “synthetic function”, on which I announced [a lecture] 
(which I will most likely not deliver, since I will be given enough time 
to speak in the opening address), I mean the synthesis of contents into 
different groups, e.g. in tonal impressions, where we add in thought 
[hineindenken] different rhythms, or in points, which can be unified 
into a figure, but also in abstract characteristics. It seems to me that 
there is here a function, which, in a certain sense, constitutes the op-
posite of perception, although numerous misunderstandings attached 
to such a notion since Kant. I intend to discuss them briefly. I don’t 




Stumpf didn’t give the lecture announced in 1896 in Munich. But a 
similar lecture, if not the same lecture, was held in 1902 at the Acad-
emy of Sciences in Berlin. The lecture didn’t survive in a written 
form, but an abstract has been published in the protocols of the Royal 
Prussian Academy of Sciences: 
 
On Abstraction and Generalisation. Abstraction is the distinction of 
parts which cannot be given in isolation. The production of general 
concepts rests on a different act, to which, in analogy with other clas-





Where Brentano, in Abstraction and Relation, speaks of abstraction as 
the product of thoughts (and not of presentations or judgments, as was 
the case in his account of ennoetism), which ‘are partly of intuitive, 
partly of predicative unity’, Stumpf suggests, rather (and at about the 
same time), that we introduce a function of synthesis, which would be 
a completely different act to the presentation or the judgment. 
In his published works at least, Brentano didn’t develop this ac-
count much further. In his lectures on descriptive psychology of 1891, 
we can already find elements suggesting that he had abandoned 
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ennoetism by that time. Indeed, in these lectures, the distinction be-
tween presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate is given a 
marginal role; in fact, Brentano focuses there on the distinction be-
tween fundamental and superposed (supraponierte) acts: abstract 
presentations are said to be superposed on intuitive presentations in 
the same way as the judgment that the table exists is superposed on 
the presentation of the table.
34
 Since superposition of y on x means 
that x is one-sidedly separable from y, this also means that Brentano 
rejected the monistic view of the relation between intuitive and ab-
stract presentations as early as 1891. 
In Marty’s lectures on psychology from 1894/95, an alternative ac-
count to ennoetism is proposed, which follows Brentano’s idea of a 
superposition relation between intuitive and abstract presentations: 
 
We assume with Aristotle a double presenting, that is [we assume] an 
abstract presenting beside the intuitive presenting, but we don’t [con-
sider] the first in causal relation with the second, but rather in such an 
inner cohesion, that only one-sided separability subsists […] In our 
case, we can also call conceptual thought a superposed presenting. 
Through the assumption of such a superposed presenting, the phe-
nomena of analysis and abstraction are explained in their particularity. 
(Marty 2010, 132) 
 
In Marty’s account, intuitive and abstract presentations constitute two 
different modes of presenting, connected together by a relation of one-
sided separability, as Brentano suggested in his lectures on descriptive 
psychology in 1891. However, Marty adds that abstract ‘superposed’ 
presentations are correlated with predicative judgments, thanks to 
which the elements of the former are ‘thought together’: 
 
The key to our yet unsolved problem of conceptual synthesis lies in 
the particular phenomena of predicative judgements. [Predicative 
judgments] are namely nothing else than predicative synthesis, pro-
duced through reflection on those syntheses which are operated in 
judgment by the one who predicatively judges. The so-called synthesis 
in understanding is first and foremost a synthesis in judgment. (Marty 
2010, p. 140f.) 
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Using Brentano’s own terms as a starting point, I propose to call this 
view a weak dualism, since it acknowledges a categorical distinction 
between intuitive and abstract presentations (which ennoetism re-
jected), while providing abstract presentations with a status of onto-
logical dependency. The account is weak not only for an ontological 
reason, but also due to the contribution of the activity of judging – al-
though not qua act of interest, but qua predicative function – to the 
formation of abstract concepts. 
 
4 Stumpf’s late account of abstraction 
Already in the second volume of the Tonpsychologie, Stumpf had 
parted ways with ennoetism for two main reasons: abstraction from 
sensory content doesn’t necessarily involve an act of interest, but even 
when parts of a presentation are isolated and thereby noticed, it 
doesn’t always follow that these parts are attended to (beachtet). No-
ticing is a judicative function that doesn’t necessarily imply an act of 
interest. 
By introducing the idea of a synthetic function in his letter to Bren-
tano in 1896, Stumpf made the first clear step in the direction of a du-
alist account of abstraction. The lecture on abstraction in 1902 in Ber-
lin most likely confirmed this orientation. However, it was not before 




In his papers on phenomena and mental functions (Stumpf 1906, 
1906a), Stumpf distinguishes between two abstracting processes: the 
first, which he calls abstraction in the normal sense, consists simply in 
the isolation of single parts from a whole. This process of abstraction 
has a psychological reality, but it concerns only the distinction be-
tween concrete and abstract. The distinction between individuality and 
generality is not obtained through this process of abstraction. It rather 
involves what Stumpf calls generalization, which we will discuss lat-
er. 
While he shares with Brentano and Marty the basic idea behind 
weak dualism – according to which there is an abstract presenting su-
perposed on intuitive presenting (Stumpf speaks of sensory contents, 
or sensations, as first-order phenomena and of abstract contents, or 
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presentations (Vorstellungen) as second-order phenomena)
36
 – he de-
finitively abandons the idea, defended by Brentano and Marty and still 
present in his Tonpsychologie, that perceiving and noticing are forms 
of judgment. In Stumpf (1906) and afterwards, perceiving and notic-
ing (which he uses synonymously) are considered to be primitive 
functions, which actually precede and ground judgment. In the 1906 
article, Stumpf doesn’t expand on the reasons that led him to change 
his mind about the nature of perception. However, parts of his motiva-
tions obviously lie in the fact that, even in the Tonpsychologie, notic-
ing (considered then as distinct from an act of interest and as a judica-
tive function) wasn’t considered an essential component in abstractive 
processes – so that, for example, the single tones in the perception of a 
chord are given as fused and are therefore perceived as a unity, with-
out any contribution from further mental functions like noticing or at-
tention. Therefore, there is a perception of structured wholes that is 
not constituted by a judicative act. The abstraction at play in the per-
ception of these structured wholes is described in 1906 as a second-
order phenomenon, but the function to which it belongs is the same as 
the perception of first-order phenomena. Perception of first- and se-
cond-order phenomena is thus taken to be the most primitive mental 
function, upon which are based two further categories of functions: 
intellectual and emotional functions. 
This conception of perception as non-judicative and as the most 
primitive mental function has further consequences on Stumpf’s con-
ception of abstraction, which also distances him further from Brenta-
no’s core position: if the most primitive forms of perception are non-
judicative by nature, then what is given in these forms of perception is 
nothing over and above the phenomena themselves. Since judicative, 
or more generally intellectual functions are based on the primitive 
function of perception, predication (and with it the attribution of prop-
erties to a subject) is something that occurs only on an intellectual lev-
el. Therefore, on the primitive level of perception, we do not perceive 




Rejecting the Brentanian thesis of perception as being judicative 
thus brings Stumpf to the conclusion that our access to objects and our 
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access to phenomena are two different kinds of access to the world. 
We have access to phenomena by simply perceiving them, but our ac-
cess to objects is mediated by a function distinct from perception, and 
thus of abstraction understood as a part of perception dealing with se-
cond-order phenomena. This function is what Stumpf calls generaliza-
tion. Generalization is a synthetic function (Zusammenfassen) and 
aims at forming concepts, which are our way of accessing objects. 
Zusammenfassung or generalization is a function that has different 
kinds of correlates, depending on which kind of generalization is in-
volved. These correlates are called by Stumpf ‘Gebilde’ – a term that 
is not easily translated.
38
 The most general correlate of generalization 
is the set (Inbegriff), or what Stumpf calls ‘the whole of what enters 
into consciousness as the specific result of a synthesis’ (1906, 29). 
More specifically, correlates are, for instance, concepts (as correlates 
of grasping or forming concepts), or gestalt-qualities, like melodies or 
geometrical figures (as correlates of grasping a form), but also states 
of affairs (as correlates of judgings and intellectual functions in gen-
eral) and values (as correlates of emotional functions). 
These Gebilde, or ‘products’ of generalizations, enjoy relative in-
dependence from actual thought: when I say ‘Vienna is the capital of 
Austria’, the state of affairs expressed by the sentence is independent 
of my concrete judging voiced by the sentence. ‘We can conceptually 
think a Gebilde without its being momentarily content of the corre-
sponding function, e.g. a state of affairs, without momentarily having 
a judgment of which it constitutes the content’ (1906, 32). This is the 
case, according to Stumpf, when we understand the meaning of a that-
clause in isolation from the propositional attitude (e.g. a belief or an 
affirmation). In this sense, believing that Vienna is the capital of Aus-
tria is certainly different from assuming that Vienna is the capital of 
Austria, but the that-clauses express something identical, which is the 
state of affairs. 
However, this doesn’t make the reality of the Gebilde independent 
from my actual thought. In order for a Gebilde to be real, it must be 
the content of an actual thought. Moreover, the Gebilde is logically 
dependent upon the function of judging as such: I can have access to 
states of affairs only on the basis or with the help of an intellectual 
function of judging. Another way to spell out Stumpf’s point would be 
                                                 
38




to say that Gebilde, like states of affairs or concepts, are merely virtu-
al entities which, in given cases, are realized thanks to concrete judg-
ments or concept formations. In this sense, their reality is ontological-
ly dependent upon concrete functions: ‘Gebilde are facts only insofar 
as they are contents of functions’ (1906, 32). However, Gebilde as 
such (as ‘virtual’ entities, as I suggest we call them) are independent 
of concrete or individual functions. Whoever thinks of a Gebilde in 
this way, as ‘virtual’ Gebilde, also necessarily thinks of the judging 
function (1906, 33). In other words, the concept of Gebilde has the 
concept of thinkability as one of its constituent parts. 
The objectivity of Gebilde is thus inseparable from the way they 
are given to us. As a matter of fact, Stumpf rejects the view that 
Gebilde are immediately given: functions (like perception, but also in-
tellectual and emotional functions) are immediately given – there are 
no unconscious perceptions – ; phenomena are given together with the 
functions (neben ihnen); but Gebilde are only mediately given. That 
is, ‘virtual’ Gebilde can only be thought together with the thought of 
the corresponding function, while real Gebilde are thought through the 
corresponding (concrete) function. 
Therefore, Gebilde enjoy a particular status: (1) they remain invar-
iable, or identical, despite variations in propositional attitudes or var-
iations in their thinkers;
39
 but at the same time, (2) their reality is onto-
logically dependent upon concrete functions, although (3) ‘virtual’ 
Gebilde are independent from concrete functions. 
Thesis (2) clearly prevents us from understanding (1) as conceptual 
realism in the Platonic sense. But what, if not precisely a variety of the 
conceptual realism rejected by Stumpf, will ensure the truth of (1)? 
This is obviously the role played by thesis (3): virtual Gebilde are pre-
cisely those which remains invariable or identical despite variations in 
propositional attitudes, or despite variation in the thinkers of Gebilde. 
Are such ‘virtual Gebilde’ really a way of avoiding conceptual re-
alism or Plato’s theory of ideas? In Stumpf (1906a), he underlines that 
his account ‘doesn’t need us to go back to Plato’s doctrine of ideas, 
since objectuality (Gegenständlichkeit) is not the same thing as reali-
ty’ (Stumpf 1906a, 10). But a few pages later, when giving the name 
‘eideology’ to the ‘science of Gebilde’ (Stumpf 1906a, 33), he adds 
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that ‘the name could and should remember us to the Plato’s doctrine 
of Ideas. The investigations comply in fact with the ones that Plato 
conducted and had in mind, although not with their metaphysical con-
sequences’ (ibid.). It seems, therefore, that what I called the virtuality 
of Gebilde, or their ‘objectuality’, as Stumpf puts it, offers a warrant 
for the objectivity of Gebilde without the metaphysical hypostatization 
involved in Plato’s doctrine of Ideas. 
Many influences are at play here. First, the vocabulary of 
objectuality (Gegenständlichkeit) is obviously borrowed from Bolza-
no, whom Stumpf mentions as a forerunner of his idea of state of af-
fairs (Stumpf 1906, 32). According to Bolzano, propositions of the 
form [A has b] are equivalent to propositions of the form [the idea of 
an A that has the property b, has objectuality]. By ‘objectuality’, Bol-
zano means the property, for an idea, of having an object. In this 
sense, Stumpf’s virtual Gebilde, like the Bolzanian subject-ideas of 
true propositions, have objectuality, which is here distinct from their 
reality. Second, since (virtual) Gebilde have the same status as 
Bolzanian ideas in themselves (Vorstellungen an sich), and since ideas 
in themselves are components of propositions in themselves, it makes 
good sense to see Stumpf’s ‘virtual Gebilde’ as bearing similarities to 
Leibniz’s ‘cogitatio possibilis’ – which was, according to Bolzano, the 
closest relative to his concept of propositions in themselves. That is, 
both the ‘cogitatio possibilis’ and the ‘virtual Gebilde’ have 
‘thinkability’ (Denkbarkeit) as part of their intension.
40
 Third, and 
more importantly, Lotze – who supervised both Stumpf’s PhD and 
Habilitation thesis – clearly influenced Stumpf’s conception of virtual 
Gebilde through his conception of generalization and, in particular, 
the conception of the kind of existence enjoyed by these functions. In 
his Logik, Lotze says that the particular mode of existence enjoyed by 
true propositions is ‘validity’ (Geltung), used in a similar sense to 
Stumpf’s term ‘objectuality’.
41
 We also find in Lotze the idea that the 
realm of propositions is a ‘world of thinkables’ (Welt des 
Denkbaren).
42
 As a matter of fact, Stumpf explicitly acknowledges the 
influence of this idea of Lotze in his conception of Gebilde.
43
 This in-
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fluence was long-lasting, since Stumpf’s dissertation from 1869, writ-
ten under Lotze’s supervision, deals precisely with Plato’s conception 
of Ideas – Stumpf tried to show, obviously under the influence of 
Lotze, that Plato was committed to a metaphysical hypostatization of 
ideas, although his theory didn’t constrained him to such a position.
44
 
Thanks to the distinction between realized Gebilde, which are on-
tologically dependent upon concrete functions, and virtual Gebilde, 
which are ontologically independent from concrete functions but re-
main logically inseparable from the concept of a function, Stumpf of-
fers an account of abstraction that isn’t based on a metaphysical or 
psychological hypostatization of the general. Insofar as they are real-
ized, Gebilde are products of synthesis, or generalization, as a particu-
lar (intellectual) function of consciousness, which itself is distinct 
from the basic function of perception. In other words, in order for me 
to have access to the concept of a rectangle, I must have had at some 
point individual presentations of different rectangles, which I general-
ized into the concept of a rectangle. This generalization is an intellec-
tual function, distinct in kind from the function of abstraction in-
volved, for instance, in imagination (which, as we have seen, is con-
sidered by Stumpf to belong to the domain of phenomena). 
Generalization gives me access to the concept of a rectangle in that 
it allows me to form the concept ‘rectangle’. In this sense, ‘a concept 
[or Gebilde] C has been formed’ and ‘a Gebilde C has been realized’ 
are synonymous locutions. This conception of generalization doesn’t 
lead to the Platonic hypostatization of ideas, since the ‘objectuality’, 
or ‘virtuality’, or ‘validity’ of Gebilden doesn’t depend upon their 
formation or realization. 
 
5 Stumpf vs Husserl 
As suggested by the letter from Stumpf to Brentano from 1896 quoted 
earlier, Stumpf began to develop the idea, in a projected lecture on 
synthetic functions, of a specific function of synthesis for the forma-
tion of concepts – distinct from the abstraction involved in perceptive 
functions like sensing, presenting, or imagining. In this sense, he ad-
vocated a dualist conception of presentations and concepts. This pro-
ject was then conducted in 1902 in a lecture entitled ‘Abstraction and 
Generalization’. In the final preparations for this lecture, Stumpf 
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wrote to Husserl to ask him about a general overview of his position 
in the second Logical Investigation. Husserl’s answer to this lost letter 
shows that the account presented by Stumpf in his 1902 lecture and 
his 1906 articles shares much with Husserl’s own outline of his posi-
tion, but also with many of his ideas in the second Logical Investiga-
tion. In the following quote from Husserl’s outline of 1902, the central 
theses are numerated from [1] to [6]: 
 
[1] I see red, I sense it and I don’t mean (meinen) “this there”, but ra-
ther the red in specie. And I don’t simply mean it […] rather, [2] I op-
erate in an adequate way the consciousness of generality, red in gen-
eral is given in itself, so that I now can say: [3] the idea of redness has 
validity, the being of the general, or, what is equivalent but not identi-
cal, [4] something red as such (ein Rotes als solches) is possible (an 
ideal possibility) […] [5] [T]o the constitution of generality belongs 
therefore […] a content, which is ideated, and an act, which ideates it, 
which grasps it specifically[…] [6] The content makes up the matter 
(Stoff), which is different from case to case, and, through the general-
izing conception (Auffassung) from case to case, the intentional con-




Many of the theses presented in this outline are also defended by 
Stumpf, but there remain a number of differences between Husserl 
and Stumpf’s conceptions of generalization. Two differences seems 
particularly significative: First, Stumpf uses a similar distinction to 
Husserl’s distinction in [1] between seeing (or sensing) ‘this red’ and 
meaning the red in specie. In the first case, Stumpf speaks of the per-
ceptive function and of its phenomena, while in the second case, he 
speaks of generalization and Gebilde: “meaning the red in specie” 
would be, in Stumpian terms, generalizing or forming (bilden) a Ge-
bilde. 
Even if there is an evident structural similarity between both theo-
ries, there still is a difference in the description of the relation between 
the thinker and the ideal Spezies: where Husserl speaks of a ‘con-
sciousness of generality’, Stumpf rather speaks of generalization as a 
process of forming Gebilde. While it make sense to say that Stumpf 
and Husserl would agree on the thesis that an individual red object in-
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stantiates a species (or a Gebilde), it seems that Stumpf would rather 
say that in order for an individual object to instantiate a species, an 
operation of generalization is necessary. In other words, one is only 
mediately given with a Gebilde.
46
 This is substantially different from 
Husserl’s [2]: while operating a consciousness of generality, ‘red in 
general is given in itself’. To put it simply, the relation of instantiation 
is sui generis according to Husserl, while it is necessarily correlated 
with an operation of generalization according to Stumpf. The idea that 
acts may grasp ‘specifically’ some contents, or that acts may grasp the 
ideal species, as formulated by Husserl in [5], is rejected by Stumpf. 
Second, it is disputable whether Stumpf would also agree with 
Husserl that [3] and [4] are only equivalent theses. To be sure, Stumpf 
agrees with what I take to be the basic line of theses [3] and [4]: the 
validity (or ‘objectuality’) of the idea is equivalent to the (ideal) pos-
sibility of an instantiation of this idea. Stumpf explicitly argues for 
this thesis in Stumpf 1906.
47
 However, if validity has thinkability as 
part of its intension, as Stumpf contends in our reconstruction, a valid 
‘virtual’ Gebilde is nothing other than a possibly realized Gebilde – 
or, to put it in Husserlian terms, the possibility of something red as 
such is nothing other than the validity of the idea of redness. There-
fore, in Stumpf’s view, [3] and [4] would not only be equivalent, but 
also synonymous. 
This nuance seems important for Stumpf’s concerns about the Pla-
tonic hypostatization of ideas. Following Lotze and Leibniz, Stumpf 
wants to avoid the Platonic hypostatization of ideas and considers va-
lidity in terms of the possibility of Gebilde, and not in terms of ideal 
being. Curiously, Husserl seems to follow Bolzano in rejecting the 
idea that the possibility of a Gebilde is part of the definition of what 
validity, or objectuality, actually is.
48
 
                                                 
46
 Stumpf (1906, 32f.) 
47
 See Stumpf (1906, 32): ‘We understand the meaning of a that-clause, when it is 
pronounced for itself, although it doesn’t express an affirmation, but only the content 
of a possible affirmation, true or false’. 
48
 Compare for instance Bolzano (1837), I: 92 ‘We can think the concept of a proposi-
tion in itself without reminding ourselves that it has the property of being thinkable. 
This makes it sufficiently clear that the indication of this property does not belong in 
the definition of this concept’ (see also pp. 99, 104 and 124 for similar assertions). 
Stumpf (1906), 33, opposes explicitly to this view: ‘when we conceptually think a 
Gebilde, e.g. a state of affairs in the utterance of an isolated that-clause, the corre-
sponding function, namely judging, must necessarily be thought along in its general 
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Despite these differences, Husserl’s and Stumpf’s accounts of ab-
straction share two essential features: 1) generalization or meaning 
(meinen) are considered by Stumpf and Husserl as functions that 
aren’t operated at the level of sensory phenomena. They belong to the 
realm of intellectual functions (Stumpf), or what Husserl would call 
the realm of the intentional. 2) Correlatively, what is generalized is an 
invariant (Stumpf), or to put it in Husserlian terms, what is meant is a 
species. 
One could still object that the account of generalization discussed 
here was developed after the publication of the Logical Investigations. 
Therefore, it couldn’t really be used as an element supporting our the-
sis that Husserl’s critique of empiricist theories of abstraction in the 
2
nd
 Logical Investigation, being directed against the theories of ab-
straction of the School of Brentano, was at least partly misguided. 
However, the reconstruction of the different stages of Stumpf’s 
(and Brentano’s) theories of abstraction between the 1870s and the 
late 1890s, and the comparison between Husserl’s species account of 
abstraction and Stumpf’s concept of Gebilde, showed that this objec-
tion has, at most, only limited validity. Despite numerous modifica-
tions over the years, our reconstruction showed that there were two 
main accounts of abstraction developed in the early school of Brenta-
no represented by Brentano, Marty, and Stumpf: 1) the monistic (or 
monistic-ennoetist) account, according to which abstraction is a func-
tion of presentations, eventually obtained with the help of interest, at-
tention, or more generally judgments, and 2) the weak-dualist account, 
according to which abstraction belongs to a higher-order (dependent) 
category of presentations (Brentano), or to a specific synthetic func-
tion leading to the production of Gebilde (Stumpf). Since the weak 
dualist account was defended by Brentano, Stumpf, and Marty already 
in the early and mid 1890s, it seems that Husserl missed his target 
when associating the empiricist conception of abstraction with the po-
sition held by the Brentanians. 
                                                                                                         
concept’. Husserl’s thesis [3] seems curious in this context, since he usually distin-
guishes his conception of propositions as species and Bolzano’s conception of propo-
sitions in themselves, referring precisely to Lotze in order to support his own view. 
On this question, see Künne (2013), §2. It seems that Stumpf attributed to Husserl the 
Bolzanian view, at least in Stumpf (1939, 89): “in recent times, influenced by Lotze’s 
Logic, Husserl underlined this true and highly meaningful core of the doctrine of Ide-





A further objection is still possible: even if Husserl didn’t take into 
consideration the weak dualism defended by Brentano, Stumpf, and 
Marty in the 1890s, it is still questionable whether this position is able 
to avoid the psychological hypostatization of the general, that is, the 
position according to which universals are intentional (immanent) ob-
jects. 
Here again, I think that our reconstruction gives an answer to the 
objection: In 1906, Stumpf considers the concept of Gebilde as includ-
ing the concept of thinkability among its parts. In order for them to be 
species, they must be thought of as correlated with a function. This 
conception is, I suggested, not only a fundamental difference with 
Husserl’s account of species, it is also coherent with a recurring idea 
in the different accounts of abstraction presented in our reconstruction, 
according to which abstract objects can only be represented distinctly 
as parts in concreta (see the ennoetist account, sect. 2). The same idea 
was expressed by the Millian thesis, endorsed in ennoetism and else-
where, that we form concepts (either by focussing on or by generaliz-
ing parts). 
In sum, the objection against Husserl’s misguided reading of the 
allegedly empiricist Brentanian conception of abstraction holds only if 
one considers the correlation of Gebilde with functions as a commit-
ment to the psychological hypostatization of the general. Coherently 
with some of the basic ideas of ennoetism and with the weak dualist 
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